A-7D SN 72-0233 initial impact with the water left only scrap metal behind. The aircraft traveled with an adverse-yaw left for 750 feet parallel to the water before entering an uncontrolled roll and losing its tail – and almost immediately afterwards, its engine. At roughly 1000’ from initial impact, the aircraft struck the water at full impact, leaving an 8’x10’ depression below the water (the tailpipe continued for the length of almost two more football fields – 1500’ from initial impact). Please see Accident Investigation Report, TAB R, DIAGRAMS (FALLOUT-IMPACT AREA, ETC) (diagram shows the recovery of the PDMS TAPE, which tape contains, intra alia, the radar altimeter’s AGL readings). The location where the aircraft came down towards the water – past the target ship – and headed away from the ship might well be explained by the recorded data from the recovered PMDS Tape.5

Prior to the recent advance of artificial intelligence (e.g., Chat GPT4), it was impossible to know what A7-D part number RT-1046 was, or for what the undefined acronyms “FLR” or “AFCS” stood-for. Please see Aircraft Accident Report, TAB H-3. It was impossible for non-aircraft specialists (e.g., the general public, like Major Monahan’s family), who were not familiar with the A-7D or its flight control systems, to understand for several significant reasons. First, the AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT contained numerous undefined acronyms in its significant maintenance issues section. Please see Accident Investigation Report, TAB H (AFTO Form 781). Second, there was no explanation of what functions these undefined acronyms performed. Third, there was no discussion on how these undefined acronyms/systems related to the flight operation of the A-7D – particularly on this medium to low altitude IFR on a visual illusion day over mirror-like water.

More specifically, there was no mention in the Aircraft Accident Report of the following A7-D instrument system: Head-Up Display (HUD). Nor was there any explanation for how the Report’s acronym “FLR” (Forward Looking Radar) and AFCS Automated Flight Control System operated, what functions these systems performed, or why these acronyms were included in the “significant” maintenance issues. Please see Accident Investigation Report, TAB H-3. If anything, the Report’s reference to FLR was seemingly insignificant and unimportant. To my family, the FLR must have been insignificant – because when the 192d Material Squadron (Maintenance) did not have the test equipment to check the pre-flight, malfunctioning FLR for SN 72-0233, the 192d cleared the aircraft for a medium to low altitude engagement over mirror-like water on a visual illusion day – with the sun rising over the water. Please see Aircraft Accident Report, TAB H-3. If there had been any discussion along these lines, TAB H of the Aircraft Accident Report would have revealed that this aircraft should have been grounded. See enclosed Report. As will be demonstrated, under no circumstances was A-7D SN 72-0233 mechanically/operationally fit to fly its first operational mission since its August 1981 transfer to the Receiving 192d TFG/149th TFS.

One final note regarding the missing undefined acronym definitions and system functions regarding the maintenance records of the subject A-7D warrants noting. Please see AFTO Form 781 (TAB-H). The omission of the names, definitions, and functions of these multiple AFCS related and other systems allowed the expert reports in the AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT to stand alone. That is, the expert report only noted that the post-crash, recovered physical evidence was working properly. As a result of the report’s omissions regarding any discussion of the maintenance issues of this aircraft prior to its fatal first and only known operational mission flight, the expert reports told an incomplete – and misleading – story of what occurred.

This is particularly true as SN 72-0322’s first operational mission at 192d TFG/149th TFS was pursuant to an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) only flight plan, requiring Major Monahan’s descent from medium to low-altitude over mirror-like water on a visual illusion day using only his AFCS instruments. And especially, low altitude was required in order to visually clear a target ship for bombing by another pilot, who Major Monahan was to engage as they flew toward each other and the target ship at low altitude over the water. Virtually none of this information, however, is contained in the official Aircraft Accident Report, drafted by Major Learned D. Barry, 192d TFG.

Major Barry – of the 192d TFG – was appointed to the Accident Board and designated to draft the findings of the Aircraft Accident Investigations and Accident Board. Please see Accident Investigation Report, TAB X, ORDERS APPOINTING ACCIDENT BOARD; see also Accident Investigation Report, TAB A-2. In fact, everyone involved in Major Monahan’s Accident Board was from the 192d TFG or its only flying squadron, the 149th TFS. Please see Accident Investigation Report, TAB X; see also Accident Investigation Report, TAB A-2. This includes Colonel Claude E. Heath (Assistant Adjutant General and then-recently appointed Wing Commander of the 192d TFG/149th TFS), who, at the direction of Major General / Adjutant General William J. McCaddin (over the 192d), authorized the appointment of Major Barry. Please see Accident Investigation Report, TAB X; see also Accident Investigation Report, TAB A-2.

A conflict of interest exists because had the maintenance and/or flight worthiness of A7-D SN 72-0322 been found to be at fault in the mishap, the commanders of the 192d TFG, 149th TFS and 192d Material Squadron (Maintenance) would have been found responsible for allowing SN 72-0322 to be flown on this low-altitude, IFR engagement.